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the Madaba Map, they lack scale, the most important element
of modern cartography.

In any case, Isaac says, the Romans never had a defensive
strategy and always saw their army as a potentially offensive
force. Wars were conducted for a variety of reasons, including

This is that rare book combining critical discussion of detail
with a broad historical vision. Isaac's command of classical,

the personal glory of the emperor, which had no "strategic"
element whatsoever.

Talmudic, and archaeological evidence is impressive and pro- To some extent, Isaac underestimates the sophistication of Rovides a solid base upon which he builds a carefully crafted ar-man military organization. The emperors did keep close track of

gument. The Limits of Empire is well worth reading for itsmilitary strength, and one should not reject the possibility of
in-depth description of both the peace- and war-time activitiesmilitary intelligence or strategic thinking because no direct atof the Roman army in the East, but it is best understood as parttestation of it has survived. Nevertheless, again, Isaac's book
of a sharp debate in Roman historiography over the question of provides balance to Luttwak's schematizations, and his point

"grand strategy" in Roman imperial military planning.

about the personal element in imperial policy is important.

In many respects, this book is a rejoinder to a work by the The book takes the long view, covering the period from the
first direct Roman control in the East in the first centuiy B.C.
military theorist Edward Luttwak,l which attempted to set out

strategic concepts behind Roman military dispositions. Lutt- well into the Byzantine period in the seventh century A.D.
wak's ideas, and particularly the notion that the Romans pos-While this approach does have its advantages, one problem is
sessed a sophisticated notion of strategic planning, have beenthat the development of institutions is not always clear. This
very influential among Roman historians.

is especially the case in the sections covering taxation, requi-

Isaac argues forcefully that Luttwak's view of a defensive sition, and impressment (angaria) by the army.
Roman Empire, guarding its borders against constant barbarian Isaac's discussions of geography are detailed and are an imthreat, is a modern one and anachronistic. The Roman frontierportant part of his argument. While the book's maps are fairly

was a much more amorphous concept than the rigid boundarygood, they are placed at the back of the book, resulting in much
suggested by Hadrian's Wall and the defensive systems in Ger-flipping back and forth. In many sections, where there are detailed geographic discussions, small, more detailed maps, keyed
many and Africa, and Isaac points out that the Romans did not
necessarily see a line of fortresses as a national boundary in the to the text, would have been most useful.

modern sense. Such structures may not have been primarily

One of the strengths of Isaac's book is the way in which

intended as defensive installations but might well have been Talmudic material is integrated into the text and put into the
placed for other purposes, such as controlling traffic and raisingcontext of Roman legal and military institutions. It is disappointing, therefore, that while Latin and Greek versions of clas-

customs revenues.

sical
texts are given, no Aramaic transcriptions are given.
Isaac perhaps takes this argument too far. As E.
L. Wheeler
Oxford
University
Press certainly has the technical capability
has pointed out in a lengthy review (and vigorous
defense)
of
to do security.
so, and a book which merited a second edition certainly
Luttwak,2 a fort can serve both external and internal
deserved this modest additional investment.
Nevertheless, Isaac's emphasis on the police and administrative
Isaac to
covers
an enormous amount of material with remarkfunctions of the army are an important counter-weight
hiserudition. A brief review cannot do it justice. His chapter
torical theories that see the military strictly in its able
war-making

on veteran colonies (ch. 7), for example, is an important con-

capacity.

The book's most dramatic argument is that the Romans had

tribution to the field and deserves more discussion. Suffice it to

no "grand strategy" in the modern sense at all. Isaac notes

say that The Limits of Empire is a classic study of frontiers and

that the Romans lacked any sort of military staff, intelligence

service, and, most importantly, the map-making ability upon

frontier policy in antiquity and as such belongs on the bookshelf of all ancient historians, whether their field is Rome or

which all modern military and political planning is based.

not. It is of value to those studying other Near Eastern empires:

While there are ancient maps, such as the Peutinger Table and

Isaac's geopolitical and military points are often applicable to
earlier, and later, periods.
JONATHAN ROTH

1 Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman
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Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976).
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